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Abstract
Regulating open access resources is welfare enhancing for society but not nec-
essarily for all users. Some of them may, therefore, oppose regulation. We examine
the short-term impact of common resource regulations under the political feasibil-
ity constraint that no user should lose from free access extraction. We ¯nd that
market-based instruments such as fees and subsidies or transferable quotas achieve
a higher and more e±cient reduction of resource extraction than non-transferable
quotas. However, they exacerbate inequalities whereas quotas tend to reduce them.
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11 Introduction
Since at least Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968), it has been well known that the open
access extraction of natural resources (e.g. clean air, water, ¯sh, forests) leads to over-
exploitation. E±ciency can be improved under regulated extraction. Consistently, natu-
ral resource extractions have been extensively regulated worldwide. For instance, in the
¯shing industry, several regulatory tools have been implemented to reduce over-¯shing,
including access rights, vessel buy-backs, quotas and ¯shing restrictions. Such regu-
lations have heterogeneous impacts on the ¯shermen's welfare. Although some might
improve their situation compared to open access, other might lose out and therefore
strongly oppose regulations. Despite being welfare-improving for the ¯shing industry as
a whole, regulations might encounter strong opposition and thus be di±cult to imple-
ment. The political feasibility of new ¯shing regulations should take into account their
acceptability by the ¯shing industry, on the basis of individual welfare.
This paper examines the performance of regulatory instruments in reducing resource
extraction under the \political feasibility constraint" that every user should be better o®
with the regulation than without it. How far can the regulation go in reducing resource
extraction without hurting users in the short run? Another dimension of political feasi-
bility is equity. Natural resource exploiters such as ¯shermen might oppose a regulation
that exacerbates inequalities. We consider equity in addition to e±ciency as criteria to
rank regulations.
We focus on three regulatory instruments. The ¯rst is an access fee to the resource
and a subsidy for those who stop extraction (e.g. a boat buy-back for ¯sheries). This
is referred to as the fee and subsidy (FS) scheme. It must be budget-balanced, i.e. the
subsidies must be entirely ¯nanced by the fees collected.1 The second instrument is an
individual, uniform and non-transferable quota (IQ). It imposes restrictions or quotas on
inputs (e.g. ¯shing days, net or vessel size) or output (e.g. catch). The third instrument
allows the users (e.g. ¯shermen) to exchange their quotas (on input or output) in a
1Note that in our framework an access fee is equivalent to a tax on output (e.g. catch) in equilibrium.
2competitive market. It is referred to as the individual transferable quota (ITQ) scheme.
The FS, IQ and ITQ regulations are commonly used to regulate ¯sheries. For in-
stance, in the Bering Sea, National Marine Services implemented crab ¯shery boat buy-
backs and landing fees to reduce the crab decline. The buy-backs were ¯nanced by a loan
to be repaid over 30 years by catch landing fees of crab ¯shermen who remained in the
¯shery. There are di®erent types of quota. Input restrictions such as vessel size, max-
imal season length, net size and ¯shing techniques are individual and non-transferable
quotas on inputs. Individual and non-transferable quotas on outputs are also applied.
For instance, the United Kingdom divides its allowable catch as ¯xed by the European
Union among groups of ¯shermen through individual quotas on catches. Individual and
transferable quotas are more and more popular worldwide, especially in New Zealand,
Australia, Canada and the United States.2
To asses the acceptability of the above regulations in a simple model, we employ the
following modelling strategy. First, since we focus on the short-term impact of regula-
tions, we rely on a static model of common resource extraction µ a la Gordon (Gordon
1954), thereby abstracting for dynamic considerations such as the evolution of the re-
source stock. Over-extraction is ine±cient in the short run (e.g. the current ¯shing
season) because it reduces the return of user's investment in the extraction e®ort.3 Sec-
ond, to capture the e±ciency gain of market-based regulations (FS and ITQs) and to
be able to analyse inequality, we need some heterogeneity in the user population, say
among ¯shermen. We therefore introduce a heterogeneous but constant marginal extrac-
tion cost.4 As with homogenous cost, under free access, ¯shermen extract the resource
provided their pro¯t is positive. But with heterogenous costs only the ¯sherman with
highest cost makes no gain from ¯shing; all others obtain a strictly positive pro¯t. Out
2Documented examples can be found in Bjorndal and Munro (1998), Hannesson (2004).
3In a static framework, free access extraction leads to ine±cient extraction because the return of one
extraction e®ort is the average product (and not the marginal product) which is equalized to marginal
cost in equilibrium (see e.g. Weitzman, 1974, Baland and Platteau, 1996).
4Marginal costs are private information which rules out heterogeneous regulations such as quotas or
taxes contingent on marginal costs.
3of the fear of losing this pro¯t, they might therefore be reluctant to agree to regulations.
The goal of a regulation is to reduce the total ¯shing e®ort under the constraint that
no ¯shermen get less than their free-access pro¯t. We provide necessary and su±cient
conditions for the implementation of a targeted ¯shing e®ort under the political feasibility
constraint for the three regulations. In our framework, FS and ITQs are equivalent since
they yield the same outcome in equilibrium. These conditions imply that the two market-
based instruments (FS and ITQs) implement at least the same ¯shing e®ort than IQs but
can reduce it further. Furthermore, the same targeted ¯shing e®ort is more e±ciently
implemented by FS and ITQs than by IQs since the former regulations select the more
e±cient ¯shermen. The less e±cient ¯shermen accept the boat buy-back (under FS)
or sell all their quotas (under ITQs). In contrast, if quotas are non-transferable (under
IQs), all ¯shermen still ¯sh but with reduced e®ort or inputs. Consequently, FS and
ITQs yield higher individual and total welfare.
Although market-based instruments tend to dominate IQs regarding e±ciency, they
have two fairness drawbacks. First, by rewarding some agents for not ¯shing (through
vessel buy-backs or the quotas sold) the market-based regulations assign part of the
welfare to non-¯shermen. These outsiders bene¯t from the ¯shing industry without con-
tributing to it. Even worse, they experience the highest welfare improvement from free
access. In contrast, under IQs, the welfare is entirely distributed to ¯shermen. Second,
the FS and ITQ schemes do not change the distribution of welfare among ¯shermen
whereas IQs reduce inequality. Moreover, inequality is reduced further with more strin-
gent quotas.
This paper is related to the theoretical literature on common-pool resource extrac-
tion. Most of this literature focuses on the emergence and enforcement of endogenous
extraction rules. Users play a common-pool resource game in which they might volun-
tarily refrain from extraction and possibly even punish those who do not do likewise
(Ostrom 1990, Sethi and Sommanathan, 1996, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan,2002, Ba-
land and Platteau, 2003).5 In contrast, here we consider exogenous regulations imposed
5In the same vein, Burton (2003) studies the problem of rule enforcement and explores how sanctions
4on users. We examine the voluntary adherence to those rules by sel¯sh users who fully
comply with them. In particular, we investigate how far the regulator can go in reducing
extraction without hurting them.
Several papers have examined the welfare and distributional impact of a speci¯c
regulation of a common resource, namely privatization. Privatization improves total
welfare but might reduce individual welfare because users earn the marginal product
rather than the average product (Weitzman, 1974, De Meza and Gould, 1987) or are
exposed to more risk (Baland and Francois, 2005).6 Here we focus on other regulations
which also improve total welfare but have non-trivial impacts on individual welfare.
Those regulations do not exclude some users but rather regulate their activity.
In the economics of ¯sheries, several papers compare ¯shery regulations but with a
di®erent focus. Androkovich and Stollery (1991) and Weitzman (2002) consider homo-
geneous ¯shermen who face uncertainty in estimating the ¯sh stock size and the demand
for ¯sh. They argue that price-based instruments such as landing fees are more e±-
cient than quantity-based ones such as individual quotas. With deterministic ¯sh stock
and demand but with heterogenous ¯shermen, as assumed here, those two regulations
lead to the same equilibrium outcome as long as quotas are transferable. Johnson and
Libecap (1982) discuss how heterogeneity in ¯sh skills a®ects regulation acceptability.
They highlight the fact that \without side payments (...), uniform quotas could leave
more productive ¯shermen worse o® than under common property conditions". Consis-
tently, in our model the more e±cient ¯shermen are those who experience the lowest
welfare improvement under IQs and therefore bind the \political feasibility constraint".
Johnson and Libecap also suggest that egalitarian pressure favours uniform quotas. We
rationalize this claim by showing than IQs reduce inequalities while ITQs exacerbate
them.7
a®ect heterogeneous ¯shermen within a community, using limited entry and uniform quotas.
6In contrast, Ambec and Hotte (2006) argue that users deprived of their common property rights
might bene¯t from privatization by extracting the resource illegally.
7In the same strand of literature, Clarck, Munro and Sumaila (2005) study the impact of buy-back
subsidies on ¯sheries previously extracted under open-access in a dynamic framework. They highlight
5The paper is organized as follows. After presenting the model and free access regime
in Section 2, we consider successively the three regulatory instruments: the fee and
subsidy scheme (Section 3), non-transferable quotas (Section 4) and transferable quotas
(Section 5). We compare the three instruments in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 The model
A community of individuals are extracting a natural resource from a common pool.
Typical examples of such common-pool natural resources include ¯sheries, forests for
timber or fuel-wood, hunting grounds and pastures. For the sake of simplicity, the
common-pool resource will be called the \¯shery" and the extractors the \¯shermen",
although the model is applicable to other common-pool resources.
Each ¯sherman selects a ¯shing e®ort x. For every ¯shing e®ort, a ¯sherman obtains
the average product of extraction Á(X) where X is the total ¯shing e®ort. The average
product is assumed to be decreasing in the ¯shing e®ort, i.e., Á0 < 0. Fishermen are
endowed with the same e®ort capacity ¹ x but di®er by their ¯shing cost. They are labelled
according to their constant marginal cost of ¯shing c which is private information. The
¯shing cost includes wages, the annual cost of a vessel, fuel, and the price of other inputs.
It might also include the opportunity cost of spending this time and money in ¯shing.
Moreover, heterogeneous ¯shing costs might capture di®erences in ¯shing skills since to
obtain a same \¯shing e®ort" some ¯shermen might need to spend more inputs (e.g.
time in the ¯shery). There is a continuum of ¯shermen (of mass 1) with costs c 2 [c;¹ c]
(with 0 < c < ¹ c) distributed according to the cumulative G(c) and density g(c). The
price of the resource is normalized to 1. When investing x units of ¯shing e®ort, the
¯sherman c obtains ¼(c) = x(Á(X) ¡ c) from the ¯shery.8
the fact that ¯shermen's anticipation of future buy-backs might lead to overcapacity. They suggest the
implementation of \incentive-adjusting approaches to management". We assume here that ¯shermen
do not anticipate the buy-back regulation, which avoids the overcapacity problem.
8If c includes only opportunity costs, the ¯sherman's payo® on ¯shing is x©(X), and the remaining
6We ¯rst consider the benchmark free-access (FA) extraction framework. In our set-
up, it is easy to show that, under free access, there exists a threshold cost cFA such that
¯shermen with lower costs ¯sh up to their capacity ¹ x while the others do not ¯sh at
all. For a given equilibrium ¯shing e®ort XFA, a ¯sherman obtains the average product
Á(XFA) per unit of e®ort. He ¯shes so long as his bene¯t exceeds his marginal cost c.





All ¯shermen with c lower than cFA obtain more than their marginal cost per unit of
e®ort. They ¯sh up to their capacity ¹ x. Fishermen whose cost is higher than cFA lose
out for each unit of e®ort. They do not ¯sh. We therefore do not call them ¯shermen





¹ xdG(c) = ¹ xG(c
FA): (2)







Figure 1. Extraction under free access
units x ¡ x are invested in an outside activity which yields (x ¡ x)c to ¯shermen c.
9In the rest of the paper we call \¯shermen" those whose costs are lower than cFA, i.e., who ¯sh
under free access.
7The downward sloping curve ¹ xÁ(¹ xG(c)) represents the bene¯t from ¯shing ¹ x units
of e®ort when ¯shermen with costs up to c ¯sh at their maximal capacity. The upward
sloping curve is the total costs of the ¯sherman c when exerting e®ort ¹ x. The threshold
¯sherman under FA cFA makes zero pro¯t from ¯shing (see condition (1)), meaning that
his bene¯t ¹ xÁ(XFA) is equal to his cost of ¯shing ¹ xcFA. It is therefore de¯ned where the
above two lines cross. Each ¯sherman c < cFA makes a strictly positive pro¯t equal to
the distance between his bene¯t at the equilibrium ¹ xÁ(XFA) (the dotted line) and his
total cost ¹ xc on the upward sloping curve. Fisherman c's pro¯t under open-access for
every c · cFA is thus:
¼
FA(c) = ¹ x[Á(X
FA) ¡ c]: (3)
The FA regime is ine±cient because ¯shermen extract the resource until the marginal
cost is equal to the average product instead of to the marginal product. This is the well-
known over-exploitation result of open access extraction of natural resources. Fishing
e®ort must be reduced to restore or, at least, increase e±ciency. This is indeed the goal
of regulations.
In the next three sections we examine the performance of regulations in implement-
ing a targeted ¯shing e®ort X < XFA under the political feasibility constraint of Pareto
improvement from free-access. The targeted ¯shing e®ort could be the one that max-
imizes the ¯shing industry's welfare in the short run. But this ¯rst-best ¯shing e®ort
might not be unanimously acceptable. Moreover, if the ¯shing stock exhibits some pos-
itive externalities outside the ¯shing industry, for instance for its biodiversity value or
impact on tourism, it might be optimal to reduce the ¯shing e®ort further.10 The ques-
tion is: how far can we go in reducing ¯shing e®orts without hurting ¯shermen? We
answer this question by considering successively three regulatory instruments: a fee and
subsidy scheme (FS) in Section 3, individual quotas (IQs) in Section 4, and individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) in Section 5.
10In this case a subsidy to the ¯shing industry might be justi¯ed. By relaxing the budget balance
constraint of the fee and subsidy scheme, it might help to meet the political feasibility constraint.
83 The fee and subsidy scheme
The ¯rst regulatory instrument is an access fee ¿ and a subsidy ¾ for those who agree to
quit the ¯shing industry. Only active ¯shermen in the free-access regime can apply for
the subsidy. It can take the form of boat buy-backs or unemployment and reconversion
bene¯ts. The fee and the subsidy are the same for all ¯shermen.11 The FS scheme must
be budget balanced in the sense that all subsidies must be entirely ¯nanced by the fees
collected.
The FS regulation raises the cost of ¯shing by ¿ and the bene¯t from not ¯shing by
¾. Fisherman c's pro¯t with a ¯shing e®ort x > 0 is thus x[Á(X)¡c]¡¿ and ¾ if x = 0.
As with under free-access, those ¯shermen whose cost is lower than a threshold level ¯sh
up to their capacity while those with a cost higher cost do not ¯sh. The threshold cost
denoted ~ c depends on both ¿ and ¾. It is de¯ned by:
¹ x[Á(X) ¡ ~ c] ¡ ¿ = ¾: (4)
The threshold ¯sherman ~ c is indi®erent to ¯shing or not. He obtains the same pro¯t
while ¯shing (left-hand side of (4)) or not ¯shing (right-hand side of (4)). The total




¹ xdG(c) = ¹ xG(~ c): (5)
Combining (4) with (5) leads to the following incentive-compatibility constraint:
¹ x[Á(¹ xG(~ c)) ¡ ~ c] ¡ ¿ = ¾: (6)
The scheme (¿;¾) leads to the threshold ¯sherman ~ c that satis¯es (6). All ¯shermen
with c < ~ c ¯sh up to their capacity ¹ x.
The FS scheme (¿;¾) increases the cost of ¯shing by ¿ +¾, as ¯sherman c has to pay
¿ but also give up to the subsidy ¾ if he ¯shes. Therefore his cost of ¯shing ¹ x units of
e®ort is now ¹ xc + ¿ + ¾. This is represented in Figure 2 below.
11It would be more e±cient to de¯ne an access fee and a subsidy contingently on c. However, it is





¹ xc + ¿ + ¾
¹ xÁ(X)
¹ xÁ(XFA)




Figure 2. Extraction with an access fee and subsidy scheme.
The regulation (¿;¾) moves upward the total costs line of ¹ x units of e®ort in Figure
2. The ¯sherman ~ c who is indi®erent to ¯shing or not is de¯ned where the new cost
curve ¹ xc + ¿ + ¾ crosses the bene¯t curve ¹ xÁ(¹ xG(c)). The ¯shing e®ort implemented is
X = ¹ xG(~ c). Each ¯sherman with c < ~ c ¯shes and makes a strictly positive pro¯t which
is equal to the distance between the equilibrium bene¯t ¹ xÁ(X) and his total cost ¹ xc+¿.
Those with c > ~ c obtain the subsidy ¾.
Now, the FS scheme (¿;¾) must satisfy the following budget-balanced constraint:
¿G(~ c) ¸ ¾(G(c
FA) ¡ G(~ c)): (7)
Combining the incentive constraint (4) with the budget balance (7) leads to:













The incentive constraint (4) forces ¿ + ¾ to be equal to the threshold ¯sherman's pro¯t
¹ x[Á(X) ¡ ~ c]. The budget balance constraint divides this pro¯t between the fee ¿ and the
subsidy ¾. The share of the fee and subsidy depend on the ratio of remaining ¯shermen
under the new regime G(~ c)
G(c
FA)
. A higher reduction of resource extraction leaves less
¯shermen on the ¯shery and more outside. Therefore the fee ¿ must be increased to
10cover the cost of subsidizing more ¯shermen from not ¯shing. Although each remaining
¯sherman pays more, each of those who give up ¯shing receives less.12
To sum up, a budget-balanced access-fee and subsidy scheme that implements a total
¯shing e®ort X yields to each ¯sherman c · ~ c a payo®,
¼








and to each ¯sherman with c ¸ ~ c,
¼





where threshold ¯sherman is de¯ned by the unique cost ~ c such that ¹ xG(~ c) = X.
We now compare these pro¯ts with the ones obtained under free access to asses the
political feasibility of the FS scheme (¿;¾). We want the regulation to be accepted by
all ¯shermen in the sense that everybody (those who still ¯sh and those who leave this
activity) must be better o® under the regulation than under FA. Formally, the following
political feasibility constraint must hold for every c · cFA:
¼
FS(c) = maxf¹ x[Á(X) ¡ c] ¡ ¿;¾g ¸ ¼
FA(c): (12)
Combining (3), (4), (12) and (7) lead to:
¹ x[Á(XFA) ¡ ~ c]




An acceptable FS scheme implements any e®ort level X that satis¯es inequality (13)
where ~ c is de¯ned in (4). In a nutshell, the threshold ¯sherman ~ c should obtain a ratio
of pro¯t improvement (left-hand side in (13)) not higher than the relative reduction in
the ¯shing e®ort (right-hand side in (13)).
It turns out that (13) is also a su±cient condition for a targeted ¯shing e®ort X to
be implemented under the political feasibility constraint with a FS scheme. It is easy to
12Note that with extra funds, i.e. if the budget-balancing is relaxed, the same target e®ort X can
be obtained with a lower fee and/or a higher subsidy while ¿ + ¾ remaining unchanged to satisfy the
incentive constraint.
11show that if (13) holds then (¿;¾) de¯ned above is acceptable to and incentive-compatible
for ¯shermen (i.e. satis¯es conditions (4) and (12)). We thus established the following
necessary and su±cient condition for the implementation of a target ¯shing e®ort with
a Pareto-improving FS scheme.
Proposition 1 A Pareto-improving fee and subsidy scheme implements a ¯shing e®ort
X if and only if
¹ x[Á(XFA) ¡ ~ c]




with ~ c such that ¹ xG(~ c) = X.
Before moving on to quotas, it is worth to mentioning that, in our model, the access
fee policy is equivalent to a tax rate on ¯shing e®ort or on catch at the equilibrium. More
precisely, the same reduction of the ¯shing e®ort with the same individual pro¯t can be
obtained with a tax rate ¿
¹ x on each unit of input x (e.g. labor, ¯shing supply, fuel) or a
tax ¿
¹ xÁ(X) on catch or output xÁ(X) instead of an access fee ¿.13 We now examine an
alternative regulatory instrument that reduces ¯shing e®orts: individual quotas.
4 Individual Quotas
Consider ¯rst a uniform individual and non-transferable quota (IQ) on ¯shing e®orts.
Fishermen are allowed only ^ x units of ¯shing e®ort with ^ x < ¹ x. Examples of such
regulations include ¯shing season restrictions, speci¯c equipment or size of vessels. It
only applies to ¯shermen active under FA, i.e. those with c < cFA.14
13This equivalence is mostly due to our assumption of a constant marginal cost which provides incen-
tives to use full e®ort capacity with per input or per output tax rates once the ¯sherman has decided
to renounce to give up the subsidy.
14If everybody can ¯sh up to the quota, since the average product becomes higher than cFA, then
some ¯shermen with c > cFA who did not ¯sh under free access will ¯sh under the IQ regime. A higher
¯shing e®ort reduction can be achieved by assigning quotas only to the active ¯shermen under FA.
12The IQ regime has two impacts. First, it restricts entry to ¯shermen c · cFA. Second,
it reduces the individual e®ort capacity to ^ x. As before, ¯shermen ¯sh up to their allowed




^ xdG(c) = ^ xG(c
FA);
which is obviously lower than under free access. Therefore the average product is higher,
i.e., Á(X) > Á(XFA). Hence, implementing a ¯shing e®ort X under IQs requires assign-












[Á(X) ¡ c] (15)
As before, we want the regulation to be acceptable to all (Pareto improving). An indi-
vidual quota level ^ x is acceptable to ¯sherman c if his pro¯t is not lower than under FA,
formally if:
^ x[Á(X) ¡ c] ¸ ¹ x[Á(X
FA) ¡ c]:
The above political feasibility condition of IQs must be satis¯ed for every ¯sherman. It
can be rewritten as,
c(¹ x ¡ ^ x) ¸ ¹ xÁ(X
FA) ¡ ^ xÁ(X); (16)
for every c · cFA. The right-hand term in (16) is the variation of catch or total revenue.
Its sign is ambiguous. Although ¯shermen experience an increase of their catch per unit
of e®ort (i.e. Á increases), since the e®ort level is lower, the total harvest and therefore
the total revenue (formally xÁ) might decrease. If revenues increase or remain equal, i.e.
if the right-hand term in (16) is positive or nil, then the acceptability condition holds for
every ¯sherman. If they decrease, i.e. if the right-hand term in (16) is strictly negative,
then political feasibility might be a problem. In that case, some ¯shermen might lose
13out under the regulation. The left-hand term in (16) is the total cost saved by reducing
the ¯shing e®ort. It is lower for ¯shermen with a low cost of ¯shing e®ort. For IQs to be
accepted by all, it should be accepted for the ones with lower ¯shing cost c. Formally,
a necessary and su±cient condition for the acceptability condition (16) to hold for all








Using (2) and (14), straightforward computation shows that the above inequality is
equivalent to the next one in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Individual quotas implement a ¯shing e®ort X if and only if
¹ x[Á(XFA) ¡ c]




Proposition 2 establishes that X can be implemented with IQs if the pro¯t improvement
of the most e±cient ¯sherman c (left-hand side) is lower or equal to the decrease in
aggregate e®ort (right hand side). As pointed out by Johnson and Libecap (1982) those
¯shermen who are the most likely to lose out and therefore to oppose the introduction of


















Figure 3. Regulation with IQ
14The downward sloping curves represent the total product under free access (using full
capacity ¹ x) and under IQs (using all e®ort quota ^ x). Here we consider the worst case for
¯shermen whereby the total product is always lower under IQs. The upward slopping
curves are total costs. All ¯shermen with costs up to cFA exhaust their quotas to ¯sh.
Every ¯sherman c earns a strictly positive pro¯t which is equal to the distance between
the equilibrium total revenue ^ xÁ(X) and his total cost ^ xc. Yet his pro¯t has not nec-
essarily improved compared to the free access regime. Recall that a ¯sherman c's free
access pro¯t is the distance between the free access revenue xÁ(XFA) and the total cost
¹ xc. Here IQs reduce revenues but also total costs. Although the reduction of revenue
is identical for all ¯shermen, the reduction of total costs is heterogeneous. Those with
higher costs per unit of e®ort experience a higher reduction of total cost and therefore a
higher increase of pro¯t. In particular the ¯sherman with the highest cost cFA obtains
the highest pro¯t increase, represented by the right-hand double arrow in Figure 3.15
On the other hand, the ¯shermen with the lowest cost c (the more \e±cient") get the
lowest increase of pro¯t. In Figure 3 this increase is almost nil because the pro¯ts under
FA and under IQs (the size of the two left-hand double arrows) are almost the same. In
other words, the political feasibility constraint (17) is binding here. This di®erence of
total cost (and thus pro¯t) among ¯shermen is due to the di®erence of slopes of the two
total cost curves which increase with lower quotas ^ x. By reducing the slope of the total
cost curve, IQs tend to \homogenize" ¯shermen's total costs.
Before moving on to transferable quotas, note that, in our framework, the individual
quota can equivalently be de¯ned on individual catch or revenue. A upper bound on
harvest ¹ Á = ^ xÁ(X) provides every ¯sherman with incentives to exhaust their quota,
thereby exerting ¯shing e®ort ^ x at the equilibrium.
15Remember that ¯shermen cFA make zero pro¯t under free access so that their increase of pro¯t is
simply their pro¯t under the IQ regime.
155 Individual and Transferable Quotas
Consider the following individual and transferable quota (ITQ) scheme. As in the pre-
ceding section, each ¯sherman c · cFA is assigned an individual level of quotas on e®ort
^ x. But now quotas can be exchanged in a competitive quota market at a price p. The
total quota level distributed is X = ^ xG(cFA).
Each ¯sherman compares the return of one unit of quota in the ¯shery with its value
on the market. By using for himself the quota to ¯sh, a ¯sherman c obtains Á(X) ¡ c.
On the other hand, he gets p by selling this unit on the market. Therefore, a ¯sherman
c prefers to sell (respectively buy) a quota if Á(X) ¡ c < p (respectively Á(X) ¡ c > p).
At the market equilibrium p, there exists ~ c = Á(X)¡p such that all ¯shermen c · ~ c buy
quotas up to their capacity ¹ x, while the others c ¸ ~ c sell all their quotas and stop ¯shing.
The market clearing condition determines ~ c such that X = ¹ xG(~ c). The equilibrium price
is thus p = Á(X)¡~ c which is the return of a quota in the ¯shery for threshold ¯sherman
~ c.
The pro¯t of a ¯sherman c with ITQs depends on whether he sells or buys quotas.
A ¯sherman with cost c · ~ c buys ¹ x ¡ ^ x units of quota to ¯sh to his full capacity ¹ x. His
pro¯t is therefore ¹ x[Á(X) ¡ c] ¡ p(¹ x ¡ ^ x). His marginal cost is c for the ¯rst units of
e®ort up to his quota endowment ^ x and c + p = c + Á(X) ¡ ~ c beyond16. Those with
c ¸ cFA sell all their quotas at price p = Á(X) ¡ ~ c and thus obtain p^ x = (Á(X) ¡ ~ c)^ x
which is the threshold ¯sherman's pro¯t from ¯shing (not including transactions in the
quota market).
Now, to implement a ¯shing e®ort X, the ^ x quotas assigned to the G(cFA) ¯shermen









Using the above relationship it is straightforward to write ¯shermen's pro¯t as in (10)
and (11), which formally shows that ¦FS(c) = ¦ITQ(c) for every ¯sherman c. Therefore,
16The last equality is due to the market equilibrium condition p = Á(X) ¡ ~ c.
16the ITQ and FS regimes assign the same equilibrium pro¯ts to the ¯shermen for any
targeted ¯shing e®ort X < XFA. Hence, from the point of view of the pro¯t-maximizing
¯shermen and the regulator, the two regulatory instruments are equivalent. We referee to
both instruments as \market-based". In the next section we compare the market-based
instruments with IQs.
6 Comparison of regulations
The market-based instruments perform better than IQs in three respects: (i) reduction
of resource extraction, (ii) total welfare, (iii) individual welfare. They however lead to
more unequal welfare distribution than IQs.
First, since the condition on the implemented ¯shing e®ort is more stringent in Propo-
sition 2 than in Proposition 1, the FS and ITQ instruments make it possible to reduce
¯shing e®ort at least as much as IQs under the political feasibility constraint (without
hurting any ¯shermen). Furthermore, some target ¯shing e®orts can be implemented
while satisfying the political feasibility constraint under FS and ITQs but not under
IQs.
Second, by minimizing the total ¯shing cost, the market-based instruments FS and
ITQs lead to higher total welfare. They both self-select the most e±cient ¯shermen who
¯sh under full capacity. In contrast the IQ regime keeps all ¯shermen in the ¯shery
with a reduced activity. All regimes yield the same total return XÁ(X) but the total
cost of ¯shing under IQs is higher than under the market-based regulations, formally
R cFA
c ^ xcdG(c) >
R ~ c
c ¹ xcdG(c).
Third, for a same targeted ¯shing e®ort X, the market-based instruments yield
strictly higher pro¯ts to almost all ¯shermen than do IQs. ITQs would yield the same
pro¯ts as IQs if no quotas were exchanged. Yet as long as costs are heterogeneous,
some transactions occur which strictly improve the parties' welfare. Fishermen who ex-
change quotas are strictly better-o® doing so, which implies that their pro¯t is strictly
higher under ITQs than under IQs. Only the threshold ¯sherman ~ c who is indi®erent to
17selling and buying quotas, and therefore might decide not to exchange quotas, has the
same pro¯t under both regimes.17 All other ¯shermen obtain strictly more under the
market-based regulations than under IQs.
We now examine the fairness properties of the three extraction regimes. Figure









. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
cFA e c
Figure 4. Distribution of pro¯ts from the ¯shery
The three curves are the pro¯t levels ¼(c) for every ¯sherman c under FA (the lower
line), IQs (the middle line), FSs or ITQs (the upper kinked curve18). The equations of
these curves are formally de¯ned in (3), (15), and (10)-(11) respectively.
Our ¯rst concern is the distribution of welfare among ¯shermen. Introducing IQs
clearly reduces inequality among ¯shermen as the slope of the pro¯t line ¼IQ(c) is always
lower than the slope of the pro¯t line ¼FA(c). On the other hand, the FS scheme or ITQs
have no impact on the distribution of welfare among the ¯shermen who ¯sh under the
17Formally, combining (5), (11) and (15) shows that ¼ITQ(~ c) = ¼IQ(~ c) = ¼FS(~ c).
18Recall that both regimes FS and ITQ yield the same equilibrium pro¯ts.
18regulatory regime since the pro¯t curves ¼FS(c) = ¼ITQ(c) and ¼FA(c) have the same
slope.19
A second fairness concern is the transfer of welfare between ¯shermen and non-
¯shermen. Under IQs, all welfare is shared among ¯shermen.20 Under the FS scheme
and ITQs, a share of this wealth is assigned to former ¯shermen through the subsidy or
the quotas sold. Those agents are not involved anymore in the ¯shing activity. They are
rewarded for not ¯shing but do not contribute to the welfare. Such a welfare distribution
violates a fairness principle requiring that someone who contributes nothing to wealth
obtains nothing. This principle, known as the \dummy axiom", is often invoked as a
fairness criterion in the axiomatic literature on surplus sharing (Moulin, 2003).21
The above two fairness drawbacks are more severe with more stringent regulations
(higher ¯shing e®ort reduction). A further reduction of X with IQs, which requires a
lower number of individual quotas ^ x, reduces the slope of the pro¯t line ¼IQ(c) for c · ~ c.
On the other hand, the same reduction of X with market-based regulations does not
change the slope of ¼FS(c) and ¼ITQ(c) on the same range of c, and therefore inequality
among ¯shermen is unchanged, but it increases the share of the welfare assigned to non-
¯shermen. Under FS, reducing X further requires an increase in both the access fee
¿ and the buy-back subsidy ¾ to exclude more ¯shermen. The threshold ¯sherman in
Figure 4 moves left. Under ITQs, reducing the total number of quotas X leads to a
higher equilibrium price in the quota market to the bene¯t of the quota sellers who do
not ¯sh at all. They obtain a higher return from selling their quota in addition to saving
their costs (or obtaining the return from their outside option c).
19If c is an opportunity cost, the non-¯shermen under the FS and ITQ regimes obtain the same payo®s
from the ¯shery (i.e. the subsidy or the revenue from marketing quotas) but inequality among them
remains the same than as under FA since their gain also includes their bene¯t from working full time
on their outside option c¹ x.
20We abstract from the consumers', suppliers' and retailers' welfare since those stakeholders are absent
in our model.
21For instance, the dummy principle was part of one the ¯rst characterization of the Shapley value
due to Shapley (1953).
19Compared to the free access benchmark, the ¯shermen who bene¯t the most from
the market-based regulations are those who give up ¯shing. This is partly due to the
fact that, since they quit the ¯shery, they save their costs c which is the highest. The
FS and ITQ regulations not only transfer welfare to non-contributors but also assign the
highest welfare improvement to them. In contrast, with IQs, the welfare improvement,
although more modest, is more equally spread.
7 Conclusion
Free-access over-exploitation of common-pool resources can be avoided or at least miti-
gated through regulated extraction. Mainstream regulations include access fee and buy-
back subsidies (FS), individual quotas (IQs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs).
When exploiters have heterogeneous extraction costs and constant return to scale, the
extraction e®ort should be carried out by the low cost exploiters. This is made possible
by the market-based regulatory instruments FS and ITQs. Instead, under IQs all users
extract the resource with reduced capacity, thereby leading to higher total extraction
costs. Thus quota transferability increases both total and individual welfare. We show
that it expands the set of extraction rates (or extraction e®ort) that can be implemented
without hurting the free access users of the resource. On the other hand, forbidding
quota transferability reduces inequality among ¯shermen. It also precludes the transfer
of part of the welfare to people who do not contribute to it. These two fairness proper-
ties might explain why IQs are widely used to regulate common-pool resources such as
¯sheries, hunting grounds or common-property forests, despite being ine±cient.
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